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The Boyd decision represents a case which has set aside time-honored legal principles and authorities in favor of supposedly well-reasoned legal
dicta. The implications that such decisions have for the public and public
policy in general can be resolved by other courts analyzing these decisions,
but Boyd should not represent the beginning of a new trend that absolves
the owner or occupier of any duty to take protective measures and use reasonable care for the safety of his invitees. The court's ruling that landowners have no duty to accede to the demands of criminals under any circumstances could very well represent a backward step in tort law, specifically for the duty of one to use reasonable care for the protection of another,
where the possibility of harm is anticipated or foreseeable. The court in
Boyd presumably had the welfare of the general public in mind when
it handed down its holding, but the practical effect of the ruling, if accepted,
may produce the opposite result.
Dan Ray Waller

TORTS-Imputed Negligence-New York No Longer Applies The
Doctrine Of Imputed Contributory Negligence
In Automobile Accident Cases.
Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc.,
353 N.Y.2d 414 (1973).
Hersz Kalechman was killed in a collision between the defendant's car,
in which he was a passenger, and a truck. The car was on an extended
lease to Kalechman's employer, Speizman Knitting Machine Co., and was
being used to travel to Mexico on business. When the accident occurred,
the car was being driven by Kalechman's father-in-law who, at his own expense, accompanied the deceased to help with the driving.'
The suit was brought by Kalechman's wife, as administratrix, for damages
for wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering. The alleged liability of
sions of the extent and nature of the duty owed Boyd by the defendants were included.
The robber was indeed an intervening cause which served to connect the injury to Boyd
with the action of the teller in ducking behind the partition. And while it was within
the realm of the defendant's actions to guard against injury to Boyd as an invitee by
doing what the robber commanded, they failed to take those actions.
1. The father-in-law was attempting to pass two trucks at a speed of about 60
miles per hour when the second truck suddenly turned in front of him.
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2
the defendant rested on Section 388 of New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law,
which made the owner of a vehicle liable for death or injuries resulting from
negligence in the operation of the vehicle by any person driving with the
permission, express or implied, of the owner.
The defendant raised the issue of contributory negligence on the part of
the deceased as an affirmative defense and entered a motion for summary
judgment. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate division reversed, holding that the deceased had dominion and control of the vehicle
and, thus, the driver's negligence must be imputed to him in an action
against the owner. 3 Held-Reversed. A passenger may recover for negligent operation of a motor vehicle-no matter what his relationshp to the
driver may be-unless it is shown that his own negligence contributed to
4
the injury.
Generally, a person incurs liability in tort only when his action causes injury to another. 5 Conversely, a person is normally barred from recovery
in those cases where he has contributed to his own injury. 6 The doctrine
of imputed contributory negligence is an exception to these principles. If
the plaintiff stands in a special relationship to a third person whose negligence has contributed to the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff may be barred
from recovery on the theory that the negligence of the third person is imputed to the plaintiff. 7 The relationships which are held sufficient to impute contributory negligence vary somewhat among jurisdictions, 8 but all are
based on an agency principle that the plaintiff has control over the activities
of the negligent third person. 9
The modern application of the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence is confined primarily to automobile negligence cases.' 0 The seminal
recognition of imputed contributory negligence in the automobile field was
in the English case of Thorogood v. Bryan" in 1849. In that case a passenger
on an omnibus was injured through the combined negligence of the bus
driver and the driver of another vehicle. The court reasoned that, by

2.
3.
4.
5.

N.Y. VEH. &TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 1970).
Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 331 N.Y.S.2d 711 (App. Div. 1972).
Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 353 N.Y.S.2d 414, 420-21 (1973).
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (4th ed. 1971).

6. Id. § 65, at 416-17.
7. Id. § 74, at 488.

8. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 74, at 488-91
(4th ed. 1971); James, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 A. L. REv. 340 (1954);
Lessler, The Proposed Discard of the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory Negligence, 20
FORD.

L. REV. 156 (1951).

9. E.g., Weber v. Stokeley-Van Camp, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1966).
See also Note, Imputed Negligence in Automobile Accident Cases, 16 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 222 (1942).
10. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 73, at 481-87 (4th ed.

1971).
11.

137 Eng. Rep. 452 (C.P. 1849).
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choosing to use the conveyance, the passenger was "identified" with the
driver because he had "employed" him and, consequently, had a right of
control over him 2 This right of control was deemed sufficient to impute
the driver's negligence to the passenger and, thereby, to bar his recovery
against the driver of the other vehicle. It is apparent that a passenger on
a public conveyance has no legal right to control the operation of the vehicle
and has no actual control over the driver; thus, the basis for imputation was
ficticious. While the case initially received limited acceptance in the United
States,' it was subsequently overruled in England' 4 and was expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in 1885.1" Nevertheless, it set
a universally accepted precedent in analogous areas.' 6
One area of its modem application within the field of automobile negligence
involves the concept that a master is vicariously liable for torts committed by
his servant within the scope of his employment.1 7 By analogy, it has been
universally held that the contributory negligence of the servant will be imputed
to the master in the master's suit, for his own injuries, against a third person."
It is noteworthy that the doctrine operates only in a suit against a third person and not in a suit between a passenger and a driver." Thus, the masterpassenger may recover from the contributorily negligent servant-driver but
not from the negligent driver of the other vehicle. This limitation is valid
in all modern applications of the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence.
The major problem with the second area in which the doctrine is traditionally applied, that of joint enterprise, is in determining just what situations
it includes. Prosser says it "is something like a partnership" in which "all
have an equal voice in directing the conduct of the enterprise. ' 20 Many
courts hold that there must be an association for pecuniary benefit, 21 while
12. Id. at 458.
13. The states which did follow the case have subsequently overruled those decisions. See, for example, Bessey v. Salemme, 19 N.E.2d 75, 85 (Mass. 1939); Bricker
v. Green, 21 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Mich. 1946); Ashworth v. Baker, 90 S.E.2d 860, 864
(Va. 1956); Reiter v. Grober, 181 N.W. 739, 740 (Wis. 1921).
14. Mills v. Armstrong (The Bernina), 13 App. Cas. 1 (1888).
15. Little v. Hackett, 116 U.S. 366 (1885). "[W]hen one has been injured by the
wrongful act of another, to which he has in no respect contributed, he should be entitled to compensation in damages from the wrong-doer." Id. at 371.
16. See James, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 LA. L. REv. 340, 344 (1954).
17. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 69, at 458-59 (4th ed.
1971).
18. Nagele-Kelly Mfg. Co. v. Hannak, 164 N.W.2d 540-541 (Mich. Ct. App.
1968); Bailey v. Jeffries-Eaves, Inc., 414 P.2d 503, 510 (N.M. 1966); Smalich v. Westfall, 269 A.2d 476, 480 (Pa. 1970); Fredrickson v. Kluever, 152 N.W.2d 346, 347
(S.D. 1967).
19. E.g., Kleinman v. Frank, 309 N.Y.S.2d 651 (App. Div. 1970), aff'd, 319 N.Y.S.
2d 852 (1971).
20. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 72, at 475 (4th ed. 1971).
21. E.g., Adams v. Treat, 472 P.2d 270, 271 (Ore. 1970). "A venture to constitute

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 6 [2022], No. 2, Art. 12

1974]

CASE NOTES

others have applied the term "joint enterprise" to such non-pecuniary associations as, for example, bowling team members traveling together in a
car. 22 At one time many courts considered marriage to be definable as a
joint enterprise. 23 Thus, if a passenger-spouse was injured in an automobile accident and the driver-spouse was contributorily negligent, that negligence would be imputed to the passenger because of the existence of the
marital relationship. 24 While what constitutes a joint enterprise is disputed,

there is apparent agreement that, once a joint enterprise is found to exist,
both vicarious liability and imputed contributory negligence will attach to en25
terprise members in suits by or against third parties.

The remaining major area of modern application of the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence is more difficult to delineate. It consists of
those situations where a principal-agent or similar relationship can be
found. 26 One of two criteria is normally used. First is the so-called "bothways" test, 27 which allows the imputation of contributory negligence only in

cases where the plaintiff would be vicariously liable as a defendant. 28 This
test would allow imputation in the master-servant and joint enterprise situations, but would limit its application in principal-agent situations to those
in which the relationship was such that vicarious liability would be imposed.

The second criterion involves the "right to control" concept. Modern applications require that there be some realistic basis for the finding of a right
to control. An example is the instance of an automobile owner riding as
a joint adventure must be for profit in a financial or commercial sense." Edlebeck
v. Hooten, 121 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Wis. 1963). This is now the prevailing view. But
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 491, comment i at 551 (1965).
22. Matta v. Welcher, 387 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
23. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Boyden, 269 F. 881, 883 (3d Cir. 1921); Caliando
v. Huck, 84 F. Supp. 598, 599 (N.D. Fla. 1949).
24. This was based on the finding of a common purpose from the relationship itself. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 72, at 477 (4th ed. 1971).
This concept is now generally repudiated. See Ingersoll v. Mason, 254 F.2d 899, 903
(8th Cir. 1958); Clemens v. O'Brien, 204 A.2d 895, 898 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1964); Virginia Transit Co. v. Simmons, 92 S.E.2d 291, 295 (Va. 1956).
25. See, for example, Stan v. Cannon, 176 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Iowa 1970); Matta
v. Welcher, 387 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Stelling v. Public Lumber Supply Co., 159 N.Y.S.2d 459, 460 (App. Div. 1957); Adams v. Treat, 472 P.2d 270, 271
(Ore. 1970); Edelbeck v. Hooten, 121 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Wis. 1963).
26. This area is broader than the others and can be considered to be the legal basis
for all three areas. Both joint enterprise and master-servant relationships are based on
the general law of agency, and some courts view them in this manner, e.g., Weber v.
Stokeley-Van Camp, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 540, 541 (Minn. 1966). The distinguishing factor is that this area includes situations which do not constitute master-servant or joint
enterprise relationships, e.g., Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 353 N.Y.S.2d 414,
415 (1973).
27. This term appears to have been coined by Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility
and Contributory Negligence, 41 YALE L.J. 831, 832 (1932).
28. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 74, at 488 (4th
ed. 1971).
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a passenger in his own car while allowing someone else to drive. In such
a case, if the driver is contributorily negligent in an accident, most courts
impute the contributory negligence of the driver to the owner-occupant in
the owner's suit against a third party. 29 Generally stated, the doctrine will
apply if the passenger's right of control is superior to that of the driver. "0

Actual control is not required; only the superior legal right is necessary.
It is relevant to note that many states have enlarged the scope of vicarious

liability through the imposition of "family purpose" doctrines 3 1 or "automobile consent" statutes.3 2 These, through the use of the "both-ways" test,
would appear also to enlarge the scope of imputed contributory negligence.
Such has been the result in a few cases, 8 but most courts have interpreted
the intent of the statutes as aiming at providing a financially responsible de-

fendant for an injured plaintiff, and have therefore refused to use them to
4
bar recovery by one who is personally innocent of negligence.3
With the increasing criticism of contributory negligence in recent years,
the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence has lost favor with most
writers in the field. 35 The viewpoint of the majority of prominent writers
29. Hession v. Liberty Asphalt Prods., Inc., 235 N.E.2d 17, 22 (Ill. Ct. App.
1968); Hamilton v. Slover, 440 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo. 1969); Red Ball Motor Freight,
Inc. v. Arnspiger, 449 S.W.2d 132, 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no writ). Contra,
Pinaglia v. Beaulieu, 250 A.2d 522, 523 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1969); Weber v. Southwest
Neb. Dairy Suppliers Inc., 193 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Neb. 1971) (jury question); Jasper
v. Freitag, 145 N.W.2d 879, 886 (N.D. 1966); Smalich v. Westfall, 269 A.2d 476, 481
'(Pa. 1970).
30. E.g., Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 353 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (1973).
31. "Family car" doctrines impose liability on the owner of an automobile which
is maintained for the general use of the immediate family. These doctrines have been
adopted in nearly half the states, e.g., King v. Smythe, 204 S.W. 296, 297 (Tenn.
1918). Several states have expressly rejected the doctrines, e.g., Grimes v. Labreck,
226 A.2d 787, 789 (N.H. 1967); Sare v. Stetz, 214 P.2d 486, 494 (Wyo. 1950). See
generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs § 73, 483-86 (4th ed. 1971).
32. "Auto consent" statutes, which make the owner of a vehicle liable for any injuries caused by negligent operation of the vehicle by anyone using it with permission,
have been adopted in about a dozen states and supercede the "family car" doctrines.
See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 1970). See also Brodsky, Motor
Vehicle Owner's Statutory Vicarious Liability in Rhode Island, 19 B.U.L. REv. 448
(1939).
33. Concerning "family car" doctrines see Pearson v. Northland Transp. Co., 239
N.W. 602, 604 (Minn. 1931); Lucy v. Allen, 117 A. 539, 540 (R.I. 1922). Concerning "auto consent" statutes see McCants v. Chenault, 130 N.E.2d 382, 383 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1954).
34. Westergren v. King, 99 A.2d 356, 360 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953); Stuart v. Pilgrim, 74 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Iowa 1956); York v. Day's, Inc., 140 A.2d 730, 732 (Me.
1958); Jacobsen v. Dailey, 36 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 1949); Mills v. Gabriel, 18
N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (App. Div. 1940).
35. See generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 23.6 (1956); W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 74 (4th ed. 1971); Gregory, Vicarious
Responsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41 YALE L.J. 831 (1932); James, Imputed
Contributory Negligence, 14 LA. L. REv. 340 (1954); James, Imputed Negligence and
Vicarious Liability: The Study of a Paradox, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 48 (1957); Keeton,
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is exemplified by Fleming James who has said, "there seems to be little if
any justification for imputing contributory negligence in any case to an innocent plaintiff."3 6 There has also been some support among the judiciary
for complete repudiation of the doctrine.3 7 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts,38 in partially reversing the original Restatement, 9 stated that imputed
contributory negligence should be allowed only in the master-servant relationship and in the joint enterprise situation. 40 Adopting the "both-ways"
test 41 and rejecting the control test in situations where vicarious liability
would not apply, is an alternative device for imputing negligence to an inno42
cent plaintiff.
One case, Weber v. Stokeley-Van Camp, Inc., 43 has significantly denounced the doctrine. In that case a master was riding in his car, driven
by his servant who was contributorily negligent in an accident with the defendant's truck. The Minnesota court, recognizing that it stood alone, took
the unprecedented step of abandoning the rule that the negligence of a servant would be imputed to the master in the master's suit against a negligent
third party. 44 The court observed:
There is no necessity for creating a solvent defendant in that situation,
nor can any of the reasons given for holding a master vicariously liable
in a suit by third persons be defended on any ground when applied
to imputing -negligence of a servant to a faultless master48 who seeks recovery from a third person for his own injury or damage.
While Weber was rejected by a South Dakota Court, 46 the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Pierson v. Edstrom,'47 expanded the Weber holding by abolishing application of the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence in the
joint enterprise situation. 48 The court in Pierson expressly limited the aboliImputed Contributory Negligence, 13 TEXAS L. REV. 161 (1935); Lessler, The Proposed
Discard of the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory Negligence, 20 FoiD. L. REV. 156
(1951).
36. James, Imputed Negligence and Vicarious Liability: The Study of a Paradox,
10 U. FLA. L. REV. 48, 52 (1957).
37. Weber v. Southwest Neb. Dairy Suppliers, Inc., 193 N.W.2d 274, 278 (Neb.
1971) (McGown, J., concurring); Smalich v. Westfall, 269 A.2d 476, 483-84 (Pa.
1970) (Roberts, J.,
concurring).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 486, 491 (1965).
39. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 485, 495 (1938).
40. One additional possible application is discussed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 494 (1965).
41. The adoption of the test seems implicit in the limited applications which are
sanctioned. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 485, 486, 491 (1965).
42. Id. § 495.
43. 144 N.W.2d 540 (Minn. 1966).
44. Id. at 545.
45. ld. at 542.
46. Wilson v. Great N. Ry., 157 N.W.2d 19, 24 (N.D. 1968).
47. 174 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. 1970).
48. ld. at 716.
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tion of the doctrine to automobile negligence cases involving a joint enter49
prise or a master-servant relationship.
Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc.50 is the first case to unequivocally
abolish the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence in automobile negligence cases. The opinion, by Judge Wachtler, is orderly and well-reasoned.
After reviewing the facts, the court properly phrased the issue as being,
"whether the driver's negligence should be imputed to the passenger so as
to bar any recovery against the owner."" 1 The leading case in New York
was Gochee v. Wagner,5 2 which announced the proposition that the negligence of the driver would, be imputed ,to the owner-occupant, in the owner's
suit against a third person, because he was present and had the legal right
to control the vehicle.53 By analogy, the present case falls under this rule
because there was no evidence presented to dispute -the fact that the deeased had the superior right of control over the vehicle. 54
The plaintiff in Kalechman proposed that Gochee be distinguished on the
basis that his suit was against the owner of the vehicle in which plaintiff
was riding, whereas in Gochee the suit was brought against the driver of
the other vehicle. The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that distinguishing the two cases would simply require modifying the Gochee doctrine
to the extent that the owner of the vehicle in which the plaintiff is a passenger should not be considered a third person, but should be considered
in the same position as the driver himself. Thus, the doctrine would not
apply. 55 Support for the proposal was offered in the concurring opinion of
Judge Shapiro in the appellate division, who stated:
Plaintiff is denied recovery-with resultant unfair 'benefit to the insurance carrier-because she sued the owner of the vehicle directly instead of suing the negligent driver. If she had done the latter she
would have been defended by this very defendant's insurance carrier
and the recovery would have been the latter's responsibility. 56
Judge Wachtler noted that such a proposal had been impliedly rejected in
two prior cases.5 7 The refusal to adopt the proposition was obviously not
based on its lack of equitable merit, but apparently on the basis that the
court wished to go further than a simple modification of the existing doctine.58
49. Id. at 716.
50. 353 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1973).
51. ld. at 415.
52. 178 N.E. 553 (N.Y. 1931).
53. Id. at 554.
54. Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 353 N.Y.S.2d 414, 417 (1973).
55. Id. at 417.
56. Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 331 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712 (App. Div.
1972) (concurring opinion).
57. Ullery v. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 295 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1968); Kleinman
v. Frank, 309 N.Y.S.2d 651, 652 (App. Div. 1970), ajj'd, 319 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1971).
58. It is noteworthy that the court could have adopted the proposal and granted
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After disposing of plaintiff's proposal, Judge Wachtler presented a concise
analysis of the criticisms of the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence. 59 Specifically, the court criticized the control theory which, while it
may have been realistic at its inception, had long since become unrealistic:
"[i]f the owner of a wagon and team handed the reins over to a passenger
to let him drive, control of the horses was within easy reach . . . . Actual
control was a possibility, not a fiction.60 Judge Wachtler adds that
with the advent of the modem automobile there is no longer any basis
for assuming that ,the passenger, no matter what his relation to the driver
may be, has capacity to assert control over or direct the operation of
a moving automobile. 61
Such criticism of the right to control, even in cases where the legal
right to do so is beyond question, has been widespread. 62 A particularly
pertinent remark was made in Sherman v. Korff:63 "[a]ny attempted
exercise of the right of control by wresting the wheel from the driver would
be foolhardy."' 64 Sherman adds that "denunciations" and "adminitions from
the back seat" are "[e]qually menacing to the driver's efficient operation
of the machine .
,5 The criticism is quite justified, on the basis of
common sense and experience alone. Judge Wachtler concluded that "the
concept now rests on a pure legal fiction" 66-that of control, which is found
to be legally existent, but which is in actuality, non-existent.
The Kalechman decision considered the validity of the "both-ways" rule
which limits the application of imputed contributory negligence to cases
where vicarious liability would apply and determines that it "isundoubtedly
correct as far as it goes."' 67 The court did not specifically apply the "bothways" test in the instant case. Use of the test would demand that unless the
deceased were to be held vicariously liable for the negligence of 'the driver,
his cause of action could not be barred by imputing contributory negligence.
This point further supports the implication that the court desired to go
further and repudiate the doctrine in its entirety.
Perhaps the strongest attack on the doctrine was based on the underlying
theory of vicarious liability. The court said that 'the doctrine of imputed
contributory negligence "is an illegitimate offspring of the vicarious liability
"...

relief to this plaintiff. Failure to do so enforces the implication that the court wished
to abolish the doctrine in its entirety.
59. Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 353 N.Y.S.2d 414, 417-18 (1973).
60. Id. at 418, quoting Note, Imputed Negligence in Automobile Accident Cases,
16 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 222 (1942).

61. Id. at 418.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Authorities cited note 35, supra.
91 N.W.2d 485 (Mich. 1958).
Id. at 487.
Id. at 487.
Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 353 N.Y.S.2d 414, 418 (1973).
Id. at 419.
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concept, which serves only to frustrate the broad policy goals of the parent
rule."' 8 This is because "a rule which departed from the common law in
response to an urge towards wider liability is being used to curtail liability
by expanding the scope of a defense to it.'69 This criticism has been extensively cited 0 and is difficult to refute. The evidence of its acceptance
can be seen in the judicial interpretations of the "family purpose" doctrines
and "automobile consent" statutes, which, as previously mentioned, refused
to use concepts which were intended to provide relief for a plaintiff as a
means of barring recovery and allowing a negligent defendant to escape li71
ability.
The court in Kalechman illustrated the harshness of the imputed contributory negligence doctrine by reference to Mills v. Gabriel,7 2 in which the New
York Court of Appeals refused to invoke that state's "auto consent" statute
to bar an absent owner's recovery for damage to his auto. 73 Applying this
to the situation in Kalechman, the court noted that in New York some relief
has been allowed in cases of property damage, and the doctrine is most often
imposed to bar relief for personal injury and death.74 This is because, in
personal injury cases, the person in legal control is necessarily present in
the vehicle and, thus, the relief from the doctrine illustrated by Mills is not
available.
The court also delineated the stare decisis in New York on related points under the doctrine. It was noted that the intra-family applications of the doctrine have been abolished 75 and that the guest statute has
been rejected. 76 The examples were cited as having contributed to the establishment of a public policy which was stated, in Continental Auto Lease
Corp. v. Campbell,77 to be "that one injured by the negligent operation of
a motor vehicle should have recourse to a financially repsonsible defendant."' 78 This is actually a public policy of all the states but, until now, the
blind application of the rule of imputed contributory negligence has often
frustrated such a basic concept.
Relying on 'the stated criticisms and decisions, Judge Wachtler declared
that "the general rule now is that the passenger's right to recover should
not be barred merely because he bears some special relationship to
68. Id. at 418.

69
(1956).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 419, quoting 2 F.

HARPER

&

F.

JAMES, LAW OF TORTS

§ 23.6, at 1274

Authorities cited note 35, supra.
Cases cited note 34, supra.
18 N.Y.S.2d 78 (App. Div. 1940).
Id. at 80.
Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 353 N.Y.S.2d 414, 419 (1973).
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
Babcock v. Jackson, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750 (1963).
280 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1967).
Id. at 124,
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the driver-a rule to which Gochee represents a somewhat incongruous exception."'7 9 While, concededly, the scope of the doctrine wag previously
limited, it is possibly misleading to state that Gochee was an exception to the
general rule. This is because, in addition to the agency relation involved in
Gochee, the doctrine appears to have been consistently applied to cases involving mater and servant ° and those of joint enterprise. 81 Thus, the statement
is more meaningful in reference to the general rule of automobile negligence
cases and not the rule of imputed contributory negligence.
The court stated its holding in very inclusive terms, saying:
We have therefore concluded that Gochee v. Wagner should be overruled, and that the general rule should be applied without exception
by allowing the plaintiff passenger to recover for negligent operation
of the vehicle-no matter what his relationship to the driver may beunless it is shown that his own personal negligence contributed to to the
injury. 82
The obvious interpretation of this holding would be that the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence is abolished in New York regardless of personal relationships, at least within the field of automobile negligence. This
would include not only the master-servant relationship, to which the Weber
v. Stokeley-Van Camp, Inc.,83 decision was limited, and the joint involving
situation, including Pierson v. Edstrom,s4 but also any relationship involving
principal and agent or the right-to-control concept. It is conceivable that
the holding was intended to be limited to the relationships exclusive of master-servant and joint enterprise questions. Such an interpretation would be
enforced by the failure to mention these latter two relationships in the holding. It seems most reasonable, however, to interpret the words of the court
literally. The court said "no matter what his relationship to the driver may
be,"8 5 and such terminology must be assumed to include any relationship
which may exist.
79. Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 353 N.Y.S.2d 414, 420 (1973).
80. See Ferris v. Sterling, 108 N.E. 406, 407 (N.Y. 1915); Bennrona Corp. v. Mulroney, 3 N.Y.S.2d 87 (App. Div. 1938); Evans v. Zimmer, 220 N.Y.S.2d 139, 146 (Sup.
Ct. 1961); Jenks v. Veeder Constr. Co., 30 N.Y.S.2d 278, 280 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Gould v.
Flato, 10 N.Y.S.2d 361, 369 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
81. See, for example, Stelling v. Public Lumber Supply Co., 159 N.Y.S.2d 459, 460
(App. Div. 1957); Cass v. Third Ave. R.R., 47 N.Y.S. 356, 358 (App. Div. 1897);
Schron v. Staten Island Elec. R.R., 45 N.Y.S. 124, 125 (App. Div. 1897). The decision
in Ullery v. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 295 N.Y.S.2d 929, 930 (1968), may appear
to contradict this statement, but a reading of the case shows that it turned on the fact
question of whether or not the passenger had any legal right to control of the vehicle.
Jenks v. Veeder Constr. Co., 30 N.Y.S.2d 278, 280 (Sup. Ct. 1941), might also appear
to hold otherwise, but that case is properly distinguished by the court in Stelling.
82. Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., ,353 N.Y.S.2d 414, 420 (1973).
83. 144 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1966).
84. 174 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn. 1970).
85. Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 353 N.Y.S.2d 414, 420 (1973).
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The effect of this holding can be seen in Natiello v. Carroll.86 That
case involved the owner-occupant of an automobile driven by his wife. The
court found that the situation fell within the rule of Gochee v. Wagner8 7
and noted that the Gochee rule was overruled by Kalechman. The application of Kalechman prevented 'the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence from being used to bar recovery by the injured owner-occupant.88 It
remains to be seen how the courts will hold when presented with different
fact sitautions, but the reasoning of the court implies a disapproval of the
doctrine in its entirety. A public policy, stated very generally, is found to
exist against the use of the doctrine, and the holding is couched in broad,
all-encompassing terms. It. seems that, had any other holding been intended, the language of the court would have been restricted to show such
an intention. It seems an inescapable conclusion that the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence is now abolished in New York.
Kalechman 'is, indeed, a "landmark" decision.8 0 The court of appeals has
recognized that the imputed contributory negligence doctrine is indefensible
in modem times. It contravenes the general policies of negligence law and
is condemned by virtually all prominent writers in the field. While founded
as a complement to vicarious liability, imputed contributory negligence is
shown to operate as an impediment to allowing the innocent compensation
by those at fault. The court should be applauded for its willingness to be
rid of the rule instead of limiting itself to the piecemeal operation which
has abounded for years.
Robert Hoagland
86. 353 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1974).

87. 178 N.E. 553 (N.Y. 1931).
88. Natiello v. Carroll, 353 N.Y.S.2d 909, 910 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
89. Id. at 910.
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